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Administrative Law
by Jennifer B. Alewine*
Courtney E. Ferrell"
and Erin G. Watstein"*
This Article surveys cases from the Georgia Supreme Court and the
Georgia Court of Appeals from June 1, 2015 to May 31, 2016, in which
principles of administrative law were a central focus of the case.'
Exhaustion of administrative remedies will be the first topic discussed,
to be followed by standard of review of an agency decision, then on to
statutory construction, with sovereign immunity and discretionary
appeals to follow, and the article will conclude with a brief review of
enactments from the 2016 regular session of the Georgia General
Assembly.
I. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
The well-established doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies continues to prevail as the Georgia Supreme Court rejects trial
courts' application of the narrow "futility exception" to the exhaustion

requirement. In Elbert County v. Sweet City Landfill, LLC, 2 the court

held a company seeking permission from Elbert County to operate a solid
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1. For an analysis of Georgia administrative law during the previous survey period,
see Jennifer B. Alewine, et al., Administrative Law, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 67
MERCER L. REV. 1 (2015).
2. 297 Ga. 429, 774 S.E.2d 658 (2015).
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waste landfill had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies when it
sought judicial relief before securing a final decision on its Special Use
Permit from the County's Board of Commissioners.3 While recognizing
that a party need not exhaust all administrative remedies when doing so
would be futile, the court reversed the trial court's holding that the
futility exception applied to Sweet City's application for a Special Use
Permit to operate a landfill. 4 The futility exception only applies when
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies would result in a
decision on the same issue by the same decision-making body, not when
a party is simply pessimistic about its odds of success before the
administrative body. 5 Since Sweet City never obtained a final decision
from the Board of Commissioners on its application for a Special Use
Permit, it could not show that it would be futile to seek a decision from
the Board before seeking judicial intervention.6
Similarly, the Georgia Supreme Court maintained the exhaustion
requirement's solid footing in the next case, refusing to carve out another
exception to the doctrine. In GeorgiaDepartmentof Behavioral Health
Developmental Disabilities v. United CerebralPalsy of Georgia, Inc.,7 a
reversal of a Georgia Court of Appeals decision 8 discussed in last year's
Article, the Georgia Supreme Court held that an agency's alleged failure
to comply with procedural requirements does not permit an aggrieved
party to bypass administrative remedial steps. 9 The court emphasized
the policies behind the requirement that parties exhaust administrative
remedies, noting the expertise administrative
agencies and
administrative law judges have regarding complex regulatory schemes,
as well as the desirability of fast and efficient resolution of procedural
defects in administrative proceedings. 10 Distinguishing the facts here
from the facts in cases relied upon by the court of appeals, the court found
that the plaintiffs made no effort to seek any administrative review prior
to filing a lawsuit." While the court of appeals held that the plaintiffs'
lack of notice as to the proceedings against them entitled them to bypass
administrative remedies, the Georgia Supreme Court refused to create a

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
mental
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 433-34, 774 S.E.2d at 663.
Id. at 433, 436, 774 S.E.2d at 663, 665.
Id. at 433, 774 S.E.2d at 663.
Id. at 433-34, 774 S.E.2d at 663.
298 Ga. 779, 784 S.E.2d 781 (2016).
United Cerebral Palsy of Ga., Inc. v. Ga. Dep't of Behavioral Health & DevelopDisabilities, 331 Ga. App. 616, 771 S.E.2d 251 (2015).
Ga. Dep't of BehavioralHealth, 298 Ga. at 790, 784 S.E.2d at 789.
Id. at 789, 784 S.E.2d at 788-89.
Id. at 791, 784 S.E.2d at 790.
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new exception to the exhaustion requirement for procedural errors by an
administrative agency and held that the plaintiffs' actual notice required
them to proceed through administrative channels. 12 Where an aggrieved
party believes a procedural mistake has been made relating to notice, the
party should provide the agency with the opportunity to correct the
mistake through the administrative review process instead of seeking
judicial recourse. 13
In RES-GA SCL, LLC v. Stonecrest Land, LLC,14 the Georgia Court of
Appeals confronted the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies in
the context of a loan dispute and a failed bank. Stonecrest, the
development company, had taken out a line of credit with Integrity, the
bank. When the bank eventually failed, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) demanded that Stonecrest pay on its loan. FDIC
issued a notice of closure, and provided a procedure through which
entities with claims against Integrity could have those claims resolved.
Stonecrest made no claim through this procedure. Following an
assignment and a sale of Stonecrest's original debt, RES-GA obtained the
rights to collect on the debt, and it sued Stonecrest. Stonecrest raised as
an affirmative defense that Integrity breached the agreement to provide
advance interest payments, and RES-GA argued Stonecrest's defenses
were barred by the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement
in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989 (FIRREA).15 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
RES-GA, and the parties filed cross-appeals.16
The court of appeals relied on its opinion in Gravitt v. Bank of the
Ozarks17 in holding the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate
Stonecrest's defenses, because FIRREA created a procedure through
which claims like Stonecrest's were required to be funneled. 1 The court
noted a case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit that held affirmative defenses exempt from the exhaustion of
remedies requirement,19 but it pointed out that "simply naming
something an affirmative defense does not determine whether a request
for relief is a true affirmative defense or is, in fact, a claim or action
12. Id. at 790, 784 S.E.2d at 789.
13. Id. at 789, 784 S.E.2d at 789.
14. 333 Ga. App. 289, 776 S.E.2d 489 (2015).
15. 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (2012 & Supp. III 2015); RES-GA SCL, LLC, 333 Ga. App. at 28991, 776 S.E.2d at 492-93.
16. RES-GA SCL, LLC, 333 Ga. App. at 289, 776 S.E.2d at 492.
17. 326 Ga. App. 461, 756 S.E.2d 695 (2014).
18. RES-GA SCL, LLC, 333 Ga. App. at 293, 776 S.E.2d at 494-95.
19. Id. at 294-95, 776 S.E.2d at 495 (discussing Am. First Fed., Inc. v. Lake Forest
Park, Inc., 198 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 1999)).
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encompassed by FIRREA. . . ."20 The court then held Stonecrest's
purported affirmative defenses were actually claims that should have
2
been brought under the administrative process provided by FIRREA. 1
Stonecrest's failure to exhaust its administrative remedies therefore
barred it from asserting its claims as affirmative defenses to RES-GA's
debt collection claim, and the court of appeals affirmed the grant of
summary judgment in favor of RES-GA. 22
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW OF AN AGENCY DECISION

This year, the Georgia Court of Appeals tackled the issue of what
exactly constitutes a "final decision" of an administrative agency under
Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) section 5-6-35(a)(1). 23
Specifically, in FinancialEducation Services, Inc. v. State,24 the court of
appeals decided that an investigative demand issued by the Governor's
Office of Consumer Affairs did amount to a final decision by that
agency. 25 This holding follows and reaffirms the Georgia Supreme
26
that an
Court's decision in Tri-State Building & Supply v. Reid
"agency's decision to issue an investigative demand is a decision of an
27
administrative agency within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)." In
Tri-State, the court held that the purposes of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 point
toward an interpretation of "decision of an administrative agency" as
inclusive of the issuance of investigative demands similar to the type
Financial Education Services received. 28 Holding that it was bound by
the Georgia Supreme Court's interpretation of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a), the
court of appeals dismissed Financial Education Service's claim for lack of
jurisdiction on the grounds that O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 required Financial
29
Education Service to file a discretionary, not direct, appeal.
III. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The question of how much deference to give to an agency's
interpretation of a statute it is charged with administering was central
20. RES-GA SCL, LLC, 333 Ga. App. at 295, 776 S.E.2d at 496.
21. Id. at 297-98, 776 S.E.2d at 497.
22. Id. at 305, 776 S.E.2d at 502.
23. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 (2013).
24. 336 Ga. App. 606, 785 S.E.2d 544 (2016).
25. Id. at 606-07, 785 S.E.2d at 545.
26. 251 Ga. 38, 302 S.E.2d 566 (1983).
27. Fin. Educ. Servs., Inc., 336 Ga. App. at 608, 785 S.E.2d at 546 (quoting Tri-State,
251 Ga. at 39, 302 S.E.2d at 568).
28. Ti-State, 251 Ga. at 39, 302 S.E.2d at 567-68.
29. Fin. Educ. Servs., Inc., 336 Ga. App. at 606-07, 608, 785 S.E.2d at 545, 546.
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to a number of Georgia cases this year. First, in Tibbles v. Teachers
Retirement System of Georgia,3 0 the Georgia Supreme Court held that the
Teachers Retirement System of Georgia's (the System) interpretation of
Georgia's teacher retirement statute should be afforded Chevron
deference. 31 After first finding that the statute's language was
unambiguous, the court held that, even if the statute was ambiguous, the
System was engaged in legislative rulemaking when it promulgated the
statute. 32 As such, the System's interpretation of the statute "would be
entitled to deference" so long as the interpretation was reasonable. 33 The
court found the System's interpretation in the instant case reasonable
and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the teacher's claim. 34
Similarly, in Black v. Bland Farms, LLC, 35 the Georgia Court of
Appeals gave deference to the Georgia Commissioner of Agriculture's
interpretation of a Vidalia onion packing date rule. 36 In this case, Bland
Farms argued this packing date rule exceeded the Commissioner's
authority by changing the shipping date authorized by O.C.G.A. § 2-14136.37

The court rejected this argument, holding that the packing date rule
was within the Commissioner's authority to create and was reasonable
in light of the language of O.C.G.A. § 2-14-136, empowering the
Commissioner to "prescribe rules or regulations which may include, but
not necessarily be limited to, quality standards, grades, packing . . . ."38
Because the packing date rule was within the power of the Commissioner
to promulgate and was reasonable in light of the statute, the court
deferred to the Commissioner's interpretation and reversed the trial
court's grant of Bland Farms' motion for judgment on the pleadings. 39

30. 297 Ga. 557, 775 S.E.2d 527 (2015).
31. Id. at 563-64, 775 S.E.2d at 532-33; see Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
32. Tibbles, 297 Ga. At 564-65, 775 S.E.2d at 533-34.
33. Id. at 563, 775 S.E.2d at 532.
34. Id. at 566, 775 S.E.2d at 534.
35. 332 Ga. App. 653, 774 S.E.2d 722 (2015).
36. Id. at 664, 774 S.E.2d at 730.
37. Id. at 663, 774 S.E.2d at 729; O.C.G.A. § 2-14-136 (2000 & Supp. 2016).
38. 332 Ga. App. at 663, 664, 774 S.E.2d at 729, 730 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 2-14-133(a)
(2000 & Supp. 2016)).
39. Id. at 664, 774 S.E.2d at 730.
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IV. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

In Rivera v. Washington,40 the Georgia Supreme Court heard two
consolidated cases that both sought a determination of whether a denial
of a claim of sovereign immunity is directly appealable under the
collateral order doctrine. The defendants in both cases giving rise to this
appeal sought reversals of trial court denials of claims of sovereign
immunity, and both argued that the issue of sovereign immunity was
collateral to the merits of their respective case and, therefore, directly
appealable. 41 In affirming the trial courts' dismissals of the direct
appeals, the court overturned its previous decision in Board of Regents of
the University System of Georgia v. Canas42 and held that "[t]he scheme
for appellate interlocutory review is legislative in nature, and provides
ample opportunity for review in appropriate cases when a defense of
immunity is raised."43 The supreme court held that Canas had overlooked
precedent in Turner v. Giles,44 noted that the General Assembly had
established the state's scheme allowing for interlocutory appeals of
sovereign immunity claims, and determined that the defendants here
45
were not entitled to direct appeal.
In GeorgiaDepartment of Labor v. RTT Associates, Inc., 46 the Georgia
Supreme Court held that the Georgia Court of Appeals erred when it
applied common law principles "regarding the ability of parties to modify
or waive contract provisions by their conduct or manifest intent" to the
issue of whether the Department of Labor had waived its sovereign
immunity by its course of conduct. 47 In this case, the Department of
Labor contracted with RTT to develop computer software. The parties
executed a written contract providing for an expiration date as well as a
clause stating that any amendments to the contract must be in a writing
fully executed by both parties. Even after the expiration date of the
contract, the Department of Labor requested several changes to the
48
software design, but no such changes were executed by the parties. In
April 2013, the Department of Labor notified RTT that it was in breach
of the contract "for its failure to deliver a functional product that

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

298 Ga. 770, 784 S.E.2d 775 (2016).
Id. at 770, 771-72, 784 S.E.2d at 776, 776-77.
295 Ga. App. 505, 672 S.E.2d 471 (2009).
Rivera, 298 Ga. at 778, 784 S.E.2d at 780.
264 Ga. 812, 450 S.E.2d 421 (1994).
Rivera, 298 Ga. at 775, 778, 784 S.E.2d at 779-80.
299 Ga. 78, 786 S.E.2d 840 (2016).
Id. at 85, 786 S.E.2d at 846.
Id. at 78-79, 786 S.E.2d at 841-42.
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complied with the contract requirements." 49 RTT filed suit against the
Department of Labor and sought damages for breach of contract. 50
The trial court concluded RTT had failed to prove the contract had
been either extended or amended by a writing executed by both parties
as required under the contract, and, as such, the Department of Labor
had not waived sovereign immunity beyond the required completion date
of the contract.51 RTT appealed and the court of appeals reversed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Department of Labor,
and found that "evidence of the parties' course of conduct created a
question of fact as to whether the parties waived or extended the required
completion date as well as the provision that the contract could be
amended only in writing." 52 The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals and upheld the order of the trial court holding that
"[g]eneral rules of contract law that might otherwise support a claim for
breach of contract damages between private parties .

.

. will not support

a claim against the state or one of its agencies if the contract is not in
writing so as to trigger the waiver of sovereign immunity." 53
The Georgia Supreme Court also affirmed that sovereign immunity
protects state entities from declaratory judgment actions in Olvera v.

University System of Georgia's Board of Regents.54 In this case, a group
of college students who are not U.S. citizens but are grant beneficiaries
of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program filed a declaratory
judgment action against the Board of Regents seeking a declaration that
they were entitled to in-state tuition.55 The court rejected the students'
argument that sovereign immunity was .waived by Georgia's
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),56 in part because the challenged
tuition residency requirements were not passed pursuant to the APA,
and the students had pointed to no other source of law containing explicit
waiver of the Board's immunity.57
V. DISCRETIONARY APPEALS

In each case evaluating discretionary versus direct appeals procedures
in this year's Survey, the Georgia Court of Appeals looked to previously

49.

Id. at 79, 786 S.E.2d at 842.

50.

Id. at 80, 786 S.E.2d at 842.

51.
52.

Id.
Id.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 82, 88, 786 S.E.2d at 844, 848.
298 Ga. 425, 782 S.E.2d 436 (2016).
Id. at 425, 782 S.E.2d at 437.
O.C.G.A. § 50-13-1 (2013).
Olvera, 298 Ga. at 427-28, 782 S.E.2d at 438.
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established Georgia Supreme Court precedent. In Schumacher v. City of
Roswell,5 8 the court of appeals dismissed a discretionary appeal where
the appellants appealed directly rather than by filing a required
59
discretionary application under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1). In that case,
property owners brought an action seeking an injunction and declaratory
relief to challenge the City's approval of a zoning ordinance that plaintiffs
believed violated their due process rights, violated the Roswell city
charter, and harmed them directly through the rezoning of their
residential properties.6 0 After the trial court granted judgment on the
pleadings for the City on all of the plaintiffs' claims, the plaintiffs filed a
direct appeal. 61 The court of appeals followed the Georgia Supreme
62
Court's decision in Trend Development Corp. v. Douglas County, which
required dismissal of appeals not filed by discretionary application when
63
a party challenges a local government's decision, such as zoning. The
court declined to draw a distinction between cases where a party initially
appeals directly to the superior court from a zoning decision and cases
where a party collaterally attacks the decision by filing an action in
64
superior court for declaratory judgment or injunctive relief. Finally, the
court held that where administrative zoning proceedings are open to all
members of the public, the "non-party" exception to filing a discretionary
application does not apply. 65 Therefore, the court of appeals held that the
plaintiffs' appeal was 'an appeal from the decision of a court reviewing
a decision of an administrative agency within the meaning of O.C.G.A. §
66
5-6-35(a)(1)' that had to proceed by discretionary application."
67
In FinancialEducation Services, Inc. v. State, the Georgia Court of
Appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction a corporation's direct appeal of
a trial court's order compelling it to comply with an investigative demand
issued by the Governor's Office of Consumer Affairs under the Fair
Business Practice Act.68 In that case, the Governor's Office of Consumer
Affairs received complaints that Financial Education Services was
58. 337 Ga. App. 268, 787 S.E.2d 254 (2016).
59. Id. at 268, 787 S.E.2d at 254.
60. Id. at 268-69, 787 S.E.2d at 254-55.
61. Id. at 269, 787 S.E.2d at 255.
62. 259 Ga. 425, 383 S.E.2d 123 (1989).
63. Schumacher, 337 Ga. App. at 270, 787 S.E.2d at 255-56.
64. Id. at 272, 787 S.E.2d at 256-57.
65. Id. at 273, 787 S.E.2d at 257.
66. Id. (quoting Fulton Cty. v. Congregation of Anshei Chesed, 275 Ga. 856, 857, 572
S.E.2d 530, 531 (2002)).
67. 336 Ga. App. 606, 785 S.E.2d 544 (2016).
68. O.C.G.A. § 10-1-403(a) (2009 & Supp. 2016); Fin. Educ. Servs., Inc., 336 Ga. App.
at 606, 785 S.E.2d at 545.
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illegally selling credit repair services and issued an investigative demand
under the Fair Business Practice Act seeking information and documents. Financial Education Services submitted what the Governor's
Office of Consumer Affairs deemed to be an incomplete response and
directed the company to comply by a certain deadline.6 9 Instead of
complying, Financial Education Services submitted a formal response
and asserted various defenses, including "that the information . .
requested encompassed protected trade secrets."70 In response, the
attorney general filed an application for an order compelling compliance
with the investigative demand, which was granted by the trial court.
Financial Education Services then filed a direct appeal, which the
attorney general moved to dismiss on the grounds that the company was
required to follow the discretionary appeal procedure set out in O.C.G.A.
§ 5-6-35.71
Citing to Georgia Supreme Court precedent in Tri-State Building
Supply v. Reid,72 the court of appeals held that "an 'agency's decision to
issue an investigative demand is a decision of an administrative agency
within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)."' 73 Financial Education
Services argued that Tri-State was wrongly decided "in that it ignores
the rationale behind O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1): that once two tribunals have
already heard a matter, a party must apply for an appeal." 74 However,
the court of appeals noted it had no authority to "overrule or modify a
decision made by the Supreme Court of Georgia." 75 The court held it was
bound by Tri-State and that "the issuance of an investigative demand is
an administrative agency decision subject to the discretionary appeal
procedure of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1), even if two tribunals have not
adjudicated the matter."76 Financial Education Services also argued that
the discretionary appeal statute did not apply because the administrator
of the Fair Business Practices Act issued the demand, and that office does
not constitute a state agency.77 The court of appeals dismantled this
argument by citing to additional precedent from the Georgia Supreme
Court holding that "[a]n administrative agency is a governmental

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
251 Ga.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Fin. Educ. Servs., Inc., 336 Ga. App. at 607, 785 S.E.2d at 545-46.
Id. at 607, 785 S.E.2d at 546.
Id.
251 Ga. 38, 302 S.E.2d 566 (1983).
Fin. Educ. Servs., Inc., 336 Ga. App. at 608, 785 S.E.2d at 546 (quoting Tri-State,
at 39, 302 S.E.2d at 568).
Id.
Id. at 608, 785 S.E.2d at 546-47.
Id.
Id. at 608, 785 S.E.2d at 547.
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authority, other than a court and other than a legislative body, which
affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or
rulemaking." 78
VI. RECENT LEGISLATION
This year saw a consistent number of enactments with major changes
to administrative agencies during the Georgia General Assembly's
regular session. The following are the more prominent measures that
have been enacted:
1. In one of the more controversial bills of the session, a new Judicial
9
Qualifications Commission was created.7
2. The Georgia Driver's Education Commission has been transferred
from the Department of Driver Services to the Governor's Office of
Highway Safety.s0
3. The State Commission on Narcotic Treatment Programs has been
created.8 1
4. The State Charter Schools Commission is now responsible for initial
82
and annual training requirements for boards of charter schools.
5. Administrative law judges are now subject to the Georgia Code of
Judicial Conduct. 83
6. A Georgia Palliative Care and Quality of Life Advisory Council and
a statewide Palliative Care Consumer and Professional Information and

&

&

78. Id. at 608-09, 785 S.E.2d at 547 (quoting Dep't of Transp. v. Del-Cook Timber Co.,
248 Ga. 734, 739, 285 S.E.2d 913, 917 (1982)).
79. Ga. S. Bill 262, Reg. Sess. (2016) (amending O.C.G.A. §§ 15-1-8 (2015 & Supp.
2016), 15-6-11 (2015 & Supp. 2016), 15-10-53 (2015 & Supp. 2016), 15-12-70 (2015 & Supp.
2016), and 15-12-135 (2015 & Supp. 2016), and enacting O.C.G.A. § 15-7-5 (Supp. 2016)).
80. Ga. H.R. Bill 806, Reg. Sess. (2016) (amending O.C.G.A. §§ 15-21-172 (2015
Supp. 2016), 15-21-179 (2015 & Supp. 2016), 35-2-101 (2012 & Supp. 2016), 40-5-32 (2014
& Supp. 2016), 40-5-53 (2014 & Supp. 2016), 40-5-100 (2014 & Supp. 2016), 40-5-150 (2014
& Supp. 2016), and 40-5-172 (2014 & Supp. 2016), repealing O.C.G.A. §§ 35-2-56 (2012
Supp. 2016) and 35-2-123 (2012 & Supp. 2016), and enacting O.C.G.A. § 35-2-15 (Supp.
2016)).
81. Ga. S. Bill 402, Reg. Sess. (2016) (enacting O.C.G.A. § 26-5-21 (Supp. 2016)).
82. Ga. H.R. Bill 895, Reg. Sess. (2016) (amending O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2-2072 (2016), 202-2083 (2016), and 20-2-2084 (2016), and enacting O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2-2073 (2016) and 20-22074 (2016)).
83. Ga. H.R. Bill 818, Reg. Sess. (2016) (amending O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-47 (2008 & Supp.
2016), 34-9-121 (2008 & Supp. 2016), 34-9-261 (2008 & Supp. 2016), 34-9-262 (2008 & Supp.
2016), 34-9-265 (2008 & Supp. 2016), 34-9-380 to 34-9-382 (2008 & Supp. 2016), and 34-9384 to 34-9-388 (2008 & Supp. 2016)).
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Education Program within the Department of Community Health have
been created. 84
7. The Commissioner of Juvenile Justice and the Commissioner of
Natural Resources have been added as voting members of the Georgia
85
Peace Officer Standards and Training Council.
8. Local governing bodies are now required to provide certain entities
with a certification of compliance with O.C.G.A. § 36-80-23,86 regarding
the prohibition on immigration sanctuary policies by local governments,
as a condition of funding.87
9. The Georgia Emergency Management Agency has been renamed the
88
Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency.
10. The Military Spouses and Veterans Licensure Act has been created
and requires professional licensing boards and other boards to adopt
rules and regulations implementing a process by which military spouses
and transitioning service members may qualify for temporary licenses,
licenses by endorsement, expedited licenses, or a combination thereof for
each profession, business, or trade for which a license is issued.89
11. The Georgia Professional Regulation Reform Act has been enacted
in response to N.C. State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 135 S. Ct.
1101 (2015), in which the Supreme Court of the United States established
a new standard for determining whether state professional licensing
boards and board members are entitled to immunity for federal antitrust
violations. 90

84. Ga. H.R. Bill 509, Reg. Sess. (2016) (amending O.C.G.A. §§ 31-7-190 to 31-7-208
(2012 & Supp. 2016)).
85. Ga. S. Bill 279, Reg. Sess. (2016) (amending O.C.G.A § 35-8-3 (2012 & Supp. 2016)).
86. O.C.G.A. § 36-80-23 (2012 & Supp. 2016).
87. Ga. S. Bill 269, Reg. Sess. (2016) (amending O.C.G.A. §§ 36-80-23 (2012 & Supp.
2016) and 50-36-4 (2013 & Supp. 2016)).
88. Ga. S. Bill 416, Reg. Sess. (2016) (amending O.C.G.A. §§ 12-5-30.4 (Supp. 2016),
12-5-204 (2012 & Supp. 2016), 20-2-1185 (Supp. 2016), 31-12-2.1 (2012 & Supp. 2016), 383-20 (2012 & Supp. 2016), 38-3-22 (2012 & Supp. 2016), 38-3-22.1 (2012 & Supp. 2016), 383-27 (2012 & Supp. 2016), 38-3-50 (2012 & Supp. 2016), 38-3-57 (2012 & Supp. 2016), 38-3140 (2012 & Supp. 2016), 38-3-141 (2012 & Supp. 2016), 38-3-142 (2012 & Supp. 2016), 383-143(2012 & Supp. 2016), 38-3-144 (2012 & Supp. 2016), 38-3-151 (2012 & Supp. 2016),
40-1-23 (2014 & Supp. 2016), 46-5-122 (2004 & Supp. 2016), 48-2-100 (Supp. 2016), 48-729.4 (2013 & Supp. 2016), 48-8-13 (2013 & Supp. 2016), and 51-1-50 (Supp. 2016), and
enacting of O.C.G.A. §§ 35-3-200 to 35-3-204 (Supp. 2016)).
89. Ga. H.R. Bill 821, Reg. Sess. (2016) (enacting O.C.G.A. § 43-1-34 (2016)).
90. Ga. H.R. Bill 952, Reg. Sess. (2016) (enacting O.C.G.A. §§ 43-1C-1 to 43-1C-3
(2016)).
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12. The Georgia Lactation Consultant Practice Act has been created,
which requires licensure of lactation consultants.91
13. The oversight of services for the aging has been transferred from
the Department of Human Services to the Department of Community
Health. 92
14. The Georgia Film and Television Trail Act has been created and
tasks the Department of Economic Development with creating a Georgia
Film and Television Trail to provide the interested public with location
sites of various film and television productions created in Georgia.93
15. The Accountability, Change Management, and Process
Improvement Act of 2016 has been enacted to require certain state
entities to develop and issue a business case and change management
plan relating to the implementation of certain projections. 94

91. Ga. H.R. Bill 649, Reg. Sess. (2016) (enacting O.C.G.A. §§ 43-22A-1 to 43-22A-13
(2016)).
92. Ga. H.R. Bill 1085, Reg. Sess. (2016) (amending O.C.G.A. §§ 49-6-60 to 49-6-63
(2013 & Supp. 2016)).
93. Ga. S. Bill 417, Reg. Sess. (2016) (amending O.C.G.A. § 45-7-21 (2016) and enacting
O.C.G.A. §§ 50-7-110 (Supp. 2016), 50-7-111 (Supp. 2016), 50-7-112 (Supp. 2016), 50-7-113
(Supp. 2016), 50-7-114 (Supp. 2016), 50-7-115 (Supp. 2016), 50-7-116 (Supp. 2016), and 507-117 (Supp. 2016)).
94. Ga. H.R. Bill 676, Reg. Sess. (2016) (enacting O.C.G.A. § 50-29-3 (Supp. 2016)).

